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The article compares the immigration discourses of three Italian parties (League, Five Star Move-
ment and Democratic Party) under the Gentiloni and first Conte governments (2016–2019). To 
this aim, it performs a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the Facebook posts published by 
the parties and their leaders during seven periods of interest, with the goal of reconstructing the 
parties’ ideal-typical basic discourses. The results prove that the centre-left Democratic Party’s and 
the populist Five Star Movement’s discourses elude xenophobic forms of Othering of migrants. 
However, the qualitative analysis shows how these actors’ approaches actually ‘spectralise’ the 
migrants, thus legitimising stricter measures and lending credibility to the right-wing League’s 
discourse. The three discourses may instead be correlated with different degrees of policy dramati-
sation. These results underline the importance of integrating discourse analysis in party-compara-
tive studies and contribute to the formulation of new hypotheses to be tested in other cases. 
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After decades of  growing salience, immigration has become one of  the 
most important issues on the political agenda of  many European states. The asylum 
crisis of  the 1990s (Luedtke 2019) and the migration crisis starting in 2015 (Trianda-
fyllidou 2018) especially have been turning points for the politicisation and even se-
curitisation of  the issue by a wide range of  actors (see Buonfino 2004). While Euro-
pean institutions, after the Schengen agreements, have increasingly pressed for the 
strengthening of  the external borders of  the Union and the strict control of  migrant 
flows (van Munster 2009), the issue has often become owned by radical right parties 
and movements across Europe at the national level, putting party systems under strain 
(Bale et al. 2010). In Italy, Matteo Salvini’s League cemented its hold on the issue after 
the 2015 crisis, which saw Italy as a key country on Europe’s Mediterranean border. 
The party further capitalised on it after the 2018 national elections, forming a gov-
ernment (the first Conte government) with the Five Star Movement (M5S) and be-
coming the most voted party in the European 2019 elections. 
Existing literature on migration discourse generally focuses on the depic-
tions of  migrants as ‘Others’ and the discourses built around them in the media and 
political context at large, or on quantitative analyses and comparisons of  the frames 
adopted by media and political actors on the phenomenon. As a result, we miss a 
comparative analysis of  how different actors depict the migrant Other (i.e., the mi-
grant who is constructed as different from us and in distinction from whom our 
identity is defined, secured and maintained) or introduce further Others in migration 
discourse. Mainstream parties, and in particular centre-left parties, are often absent in 
this strand of  research. Thus, while most works agree that the immigration issue has 
been increasingly presented to the public through securitarian lenses (see for example 
Huysmans 2006), we know little about whether this is coupled with a homogeneous 
change in Othering practices by most actors, or if  different images of  Others are 
mobilised by different actors even when they share a common frame. Indeed, if  dif-
ferent frames are deployed to increase consensus and legitimise policies (Entman 
1993), also different ways of  depicting Others produce different discourses and 
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imperatives to action (or inaction) (Hansen 2006). 
Mapping the variations in the Othering practices of  different actors in mi-
gration discourse can aid the comprehension of  another facet of  how actors create 
consensus and legitimise or delegitimise certain immigration policies. In perspective, 
we might find correlations with the characteristics of  proposed policies, with electoral 
results and with the ways racism and xenophobia spread, and investigate the interac-
tions between the findings on this level of  analysis and others, such as communication 
frames. In particular, it is important to understand what images of  the Other are 
produced by those actors who do not initially own the migration issue and are forced 
to confront themselves with it, and whether and how these images fuel into the secu-
ritarian and identitarian hard-line rhetoric of  radical right parties. 
This work intends to perform a hypothesis-generating descriptive analysis 
of  a case-study (Lijphart 1971). The case under study will be the Italian one, as after 
the 2015 crisis the country saw governments led first by the centre-left mainstream 
Democratic Party (PD) and then by a populist alliance of  the Five Star Movement 
and the radical right League. My research question is: what are the dominant Others 
and the discourses constructed around them in the migration-related communication 
of  the main Italian political parties between 2017 and the end of  the first Conte gov-
ernment, in 2019? To answer it, I will focus on the social media discourse on Face-
book of  the three parties and their leaders: the Democratic Party, the Five Star Move-
ment and the League. While the PD’s political positioning is clear, the M5S and the 
League require further clarification as they represent different forms of  populism. 
The League was originally born as a regionalist party claiming to represent the inter-
ests of  Northern Italy but has then steadily shifted towards nativism and radical right 
populism (Mudde 2007), with the main conflict in its narrative being a cultural one 
between an ethnically defined Italian people and immigrants and Muslims (Ivaldi et 
al. 2017). The M5S’s populist stance at its birth was instead devoid of  markedly radical 
right elements and notably fuzzy on the left-right spectrum, simply positing the party 
as representing the common people versus the Italian political elites (Ivaldi et al. 2017; 
Mosca & Tronconi 2019). 
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Italy has been chosen as the country under analysis due to it having been 
one of  the European countries most affected by the new migratory flows of  the 
recent years. While being one of  the main entry points to Europe from the African 
continent, Italy was not the focus of  attention at the height of  the refugee crisis 
starting in 2015; nonetheless, successive Italian governments have suffered or ex-
ploited the pressure of  a public opinion increasingly concerned with new arrivals.1 
The year 2015 actually marked a slight decrease in arrivals (153,842), down from 
170,100 in 2014. After the closure of  the Eastern Mediterranean route, the number 
of  arrivals rose again in 2016, reaching 181,436 (UNHCR 2019). 
Within this context, despite their ideological difference, both the centre-left 
Gentiloni government in 2017 and the first Conte government in 2018 and 2019 
adopted controversial immigration policies, often criticised for their humanitarian 
outcomes (see Hermanin 2017; Strazzari & Grandi 2019). In particular, the Gentiloni 
government was criticised for its controversial agreements with Al-Sarraj’s Lybian 
government to stem the flow of  migrants, its restrictive ‘immigration decree’ and the 
attempt to impose a ‘code of  conduct’ on NGO ships operating in the Mediterranean. 
The following Conte government saw Interior Minister Salvini, the League’s leader, 
implement his ‘shut ports’ doctrine against migrant-rescuing at sea and produced two 
so-called ‘security decrees’, restrictive towards asylum seekers, the Italian reception 
system and NGOs. Choosing these two governments thus makes it possible to ana-
lyse the communication of  parties that have all adopted at least partly restrictive im-
migration policies despite their opposing political stances; moreover, the similar con-
text in which they act allows us to effectively compare the discourses between differ-
ent parties and between the same party when in office or in opposition. 
The paper is structured as follows: section 2 will first review the main liter-
ature related to migration discourse and to migration and party competition. Then 
section 3 will explain the methodological choices adopted for this study. Section 4 
 
1 According to Standard Eurobarometer data, the share of people considering immigration one of the 
two most important problems in the country almost tripled in 2014 to 17% (up from 6%) and then 
doubled again in the following two years, before stabilising at 34% and then eventually decreasing to 
22% in the first six months of 2019. 
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will review the results of  the analysis and discuss the findings, identifying the domi-
nant discourses of  the main actors in specific contexts and discussing their interac-
tions. Finally, section 5 will present some final remarks. 
 
2. Policy stances, frames, Others: A review of migration literature 
Immigration is an extremely multi-faceted issue, spanning several policy 
fields. As such, it is first necessary to clarify what its facets are, in order to avoid 
conceptual stretching or ambiguity. In particular, in order to define immigration, we 
need to distinguish it from integration. According to Akkerman (2015), immigration 
refers to issues of  labour immigration, access to citizenship, asylum, illegality and 
family reunification. Integration is instead related to social rights, the relationship with 
religious minorities (Muslims in particular) and assimilationist or pluralist trajectories 
of  integration. If, however, according to Heckmann (2003, p. 46) integration is ‘the 
inclusion of  new populations into the existing social structures of  the immigration 
country’, then we should also include in it the sub-field of  citizenship access, as the 
main gate to institutional inclusion. Immigration should instead aggregate those sub-
fields that govern migrants as incoming subjects and – once arrived – distinct aliens 
and not as prospective full members of  society: asylum, labour immigration, repatri-
ation and reception policy, but also border control and externalisation, and all policies 
meant to tackle the so-called ‘push factors’. Importantly, a policy pledge related to an 
immigration sub-field may well be justified through reference to another sub-field, or 
to integration considerations. 
A sizeable literature has already developed on the theme of  different parties’ 
immigration stances (see Odmalm 2019 for a comprehensive review); the main ob-
jects of  research are parties’ positions and electoral strategies on the immigration 
issue. From a party competition view, the immigration issue becomes relevant in the 
1980s, with the increasing salience of  the issue within the electoral agendas of  radical 
right parties. It is since the late 1980s and the 1990s that immigration has truly be-
come one of  their most important owned issues, however (Mudde 1999; Sonia & da 
Fonseca 2011). The salience of  the issue has considerably grown since then, 
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prompting most actors and party systems to make choices and undergo transfor-
mations in reaction to it. 
Most of  these works focus on parties’ positioning relative to each other ac-
cording to their chosen policy approach to immigration. Immigration has often been 
seen as a valence issue, with a directional consensus in the electorate towards stricter 
policies and parties competing over their competence and ability to provide the de-
sired outcome (Odmalm & Bale 2015). If  parties treated immigration as a valence 
issue, we would expect differences and increases in salience in party manifestos not 
to be related to the parties’ ideological positions. However, this does not seem to 
happen (Morales et al. 2015). Ideology has proven time and again to be an important 
factor in determining party positions, although in conjunction with factors such as 
competition from radical right parties (Mudde 2004; Sonia & da Fonseca 2011), pub-
lic opinion shifts (Odmalm & Bale 2015), leaders’ decisions (Bale & Partos 2014), 
other parties’ behaviour (Bale et al. 2010) and incumbency (Castelli Gattinara 2016). 
Mainstream left parties, at least in Italy, seem to maintain more open and humanitar-
ian positions than their opponents, shifting to pragmatic stances when in government 
(Urso 2018). The Italian mainstream right has instead usually adopted securitarian 
stances, also espoused by more radical parties such as the Northern League (Castelli 
Gattinara 2016). 
Most of  this literature performs quantitative analyses of  party manifestos; 
as a result, we risk missing the ways parties justify their positions and frame the very 
issue of  immigration accordingly. Authors such as Helbling (2014) and Castelli Gat-
tinara (2016) have instead used frames specifically developed for the immigration is-
sue to capture this dimension of  party competition. Frames are, according to Entman 
(1993), schemes of  interpretation that promote a particular problem definition or 
causal interpretation. Frames have more often been used for studies on media and 
immigration (Greussing & Boomgaarden 2017; Vollmer & Karakayali 2018) or on 
dominant political discourses, without a comparative approach between parties and 
party families (Triandafyllidou 2018; Guillem & Cvetkovic 2019). The framing ap-
proach is particularly useful when considering not party manifestos, but party 
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officials’ declarations or other means of  public communication. Through it, we can 
understand how parties compete not only by adopting different evaluative stances on 
the issue, but by changing the terms through which the issue is perceived as a prob-
lem, a moral duty or a resource. 
Helbling (2014) uses seven framing categories: national, multicultural, 
moral-universal, economic prosperity, labour and social security, security (including 
both national security and terrorism on one side, and law and order on the other) and 
the neutral pragmatic. These categories are defined in more detail in the following 
section. The security frame might be further articulated into a proper security (or 
geopolitical, as Chouliaraki & Zaborowski (2017) term it) frame that refers to terror-
ism, national security and war, and a law and order frame which accentuates cases of  
domestic deviancy and criminality. In Italy, negative framings of  immigration have 
historically focused on this theme of  insecurity and ‘urban safety’, i.e. law and order 
(Marzorati 2013). Greussing and Boomgaarden, who adopt a statistical approach to 
identifying clusters of  words which they then label as different frames (2017), also 
find economicisation (which is centred on the economic burden represented by im-
migrants) as a main frame in the Austrian press in 2015.  
The use of  these frames, however, does not capture the Othering discourses 
of  party actors; indeed, the discursive images of  the immigrant Other are studied in 
works that do not compare parties. In the literature we can traditionally find two main 
ideal-types of  images of  the immigrant Other (Anderson 2008): the villain, or evil-
doer, and the victim. The first is a radical Other, characterised by an irreducible di-
versity that challenges the identity and the value system of  the community that depicts 
it as a threat (Hansen 2006). Radical Otherness satisfies a community’s desire to locate 
responsibility for the dangers and pain of  life in an out-group that can be held ac-
countable for them and nullifies the potential for questioning the very nature of  one’s 
identity that the Other retains by defining it as evil or irrational (Connolly 1991). The 
in-group is thus shielded from criticism or blame for any societal stress that is occur-
ring. This radical diversity and opposition may be constructed on different grounds, 
however: the migrant may be enemified and associated with terrorists (Squire 2015) 
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or be considered culturally unassimilable and threatening to national unity (Marino 
2015) and/or prone to turn to delinquency and commit serious crimes that disrupt 
the social order (Vollmer & Karakayali 2018). Delinquency itself  can be explicitly 
traced back to the immigrant’s cultural and racialised roots or be attributed to other 
socio-economic causes (van Munster 2009), or not be contextualised. These pro-
cesses are common to most countries harbouring hostility towards migrants by parts 
of  their society, including Italy: here, migrant Othering is mainly based on cultural 
difference and criminalisation (Benveniste et al. 2016). These cases are usually related 
to nativism, an ideology (in Mudde’s (2007) definition) in which the in-group is iden-
tified with the culturally homogeneous native inhabitants of  the nation-state. 
Otherness, however, does not need to be radical. Hansen (2006) posits the 
existence of  more degrees of  Otherness, which are all instrumental in defining by 
opposition the Self  of  the in-group community, but which may do so in other ways 
than threat, and which may all be used to legitimise specific policies. On the opposite 
side of  evil-doers, migrants may also become a victimised Other. Victims are passive 
subjects who have had to endure violence, poverty or other forms of  pain in their 
origin country and/or during the perilous journey or even after their arrival in the 
immigration country. In this context, victimised migrants are not viewed as a threat, 
but they are still clearly considered different from the population of  the reference 
community and are treated as passive actors without agency, towards whom we have 
a charity duty. This also turns them into dehumanised beings (Chouliaraki & Zab-
orowski 2017). In this case, the in-group does not necessarily coincide with the pop-
ulation of  the host-state as a whole but may also be identified with smaller groups of  
benefactors, while also being opposed to variously depicted groups of  abusers both 
in the migrants’ home and host states. At the same time, however, these depictions 
strengthen long-standing images of  underdevelopment and its opposition to the de-
veloped and ‘civilised’ world (Agustín 2003). 
The overlaps between these images and the categories of  refugee and eco-
nomic migrant are instrumental to most discursive strategies: in particular, the eco-
nomic migrant is often conflated with the criminal evil-doer through the use of  the 
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lexicons ‘illegal’ and ‘criminal’, through which economic migrants and even refugee 
claimants are already depicted as breaking the law and associated with delinquency 
(Gilbert 2013). Thanks to this overlap all those who have not yet been granted asylum 
become illegal immigrants, and illegal immigrants become problematic or dangerous 
criminals.  
All these images are mediated by the tropes of  silencing, collectivisation and 
de-contextualisation (Chouliaraki & Zaborowski 2017): migrants are stripped of  their 
voice, presented as parts of  collective referents and never as individuals, and deprived 
of  the background reasons for their journey, as though they have perpetually existed 
in the state of  the migrant flow. This way, they can more easily be attributed the 
specific characteristics of  one of  the previous stereotypical images and better fit 
within an overarching narrative. Moreover, migrants are racialised and gendered: 
groups are associated with racial attributes and victims are generally associated with 
children and females, while males are more strongly associated with cases of  violence 
(both general and gendered one) (see Johnson 2011; Wilmott 2017; Tyler 2018; Gray 
& Franck 2019). Victims and evil-doers are also different with respect to agency: while 
both are silenced, for victims this means that they are without agency, just a vulnerable 
body; evil-doers are instead ascribed agency, but also maliciousness, which restricts 
the immigrant’s agency to their capacity to harm the host society (Chouliaraki & Zab-
orowski 2017). 
By using the concept of  the Other, we can avoid limiting ourselves to a 
quantitative comparison of  the frequency of  different frames or images of  the Other, 
but we can instead construct each party’s ‘basic discourses’ and compare them. Basic 
discourses, in Hansen’s (2006) interpretation, are analytical constructs through which 
the construction and linking of  identity and policy can be studied. They ‘construct 
different Others with different degrees of  radical difference; articulate radically di-
verging forms of  spatial, temporal, and ethical identity; and construct competing links 
between identity and policy’ (Hansen 2006, p. 46). Basic discourses are ideal-types of  
specific associations that compete or become hegemonic within a wider debate and 
are strongly linked with the concepts of  identity and Other. Through them, we can 
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not only consider different frames, Othered subjects and policy sub-fields separately, 
but we may also analyse how they together build a coherent discourse that competes 
with others in the public arena. In the Italian case, such constructs would allow to 
confirm whether the League mainly combines a law and order frame with a criminal-
ised Othering of  migrants, to understand what depictions are combined with the PD’s 
likely mixed humanitarian-pragmatic stance, and to map the M5S’s approach to the 
issue. The M5S’s case is particularly interesting, as Gianfreda (2018) has shown that 
the party has actually shied away from addressing migration and the very figure of  
the migrant in the parliamentary debates on the 2015 refugee crisis. 
 
3. Methodology 
The aim of  this work is to identify the Othered images present in political 
discourses of  various Italian actors over the immigration issue during the Gentiloni 
and the first Conte government. From these images and through their comparison 
with the frames employed by the parties, a series of  ideal-typical basic discourses 
(Hansen 2006) attributed to each actor in a certain context may be constructed, and 
their relationships investigated. The selected period is still characterised by limited 
research due to its proximity in time. Moreover, it is a unique chance to study and 
compare the characteristics and evolution of  actors’ discourses in a period of  shift 
between a mainstream centre-left government and a populist-radical right one, where 
an actor with a seemingly mostly pragmatic discourse (if  we assimilate it to the pre-
vious record of  the centre-left Renzi government in 2015 (Colombo 2018)) has been 
replaced in office by a government characterised by a much harsher rhetoric. At the 
same time, both governments have been accused by several critics of  implementing 
illiberal measures against migrants; therefore, we might hypothesise that the dis-
courses of  such different actors may be more similar or interact with each other in 
ways that we do not capture only by coding and analysing their manifestos.  
The selected actors are the PD, League and M5S. They have been chosen as 
they were all a major ruling party during one of  the two governments under study; 
moreover, they have been the three most voted parties both in the 2018 national 
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elections and in the 2019 European Parliament elections. Their choice allows for a 
comparison of  a mainstream left, a radical right and a populist actor in the same time 
frame. 
The data for the analysis have been scraped from the Facebook communi-
cation of  these actors and of  their leaders. The choice of  a social media such as 
Facebook for this kind of  work needs justification, as most other studies focus in-
stead on media outlets, party manifestos or parliamentary debates (see Guillem & 
Cvetkovic 2019; Odmalm 2019). The choice to focus on media rather than manifes-
toes is demanded by the object of  the analysis, as it allows to gather more data on the 
communicative approaches parties adopt not only to propose policies, but also to 
constantly describe and interpret the varying actors and events of  the Italian migra-
tion issue before the wider public. Moreover, the political communication of  parties 
is nowadays increasingly influenced by their social media strategies, as social media 
allow political actors to bypass the media in setting the agenda and refine and spread 
their own framing of  specific issues (Ross & Bürger 2017). This means that by focus-
ing on social instead of  traditional media we can find a version of  actors’ discourses 
closer to what they actually intend to spread. Furthermore, networking and trans-
coding allow the social communication of  one actor to reproduce messages of  other 
actors or distributed on other media (Schulz 2014), which means that we still have 
access to a plethora of  communication forms, from simple posts and self-interviews 
to interventions in TV debates and press articles. Therefore, the results should not 
be excessively biased by media-specific contents and tropes; instead, using social me-
dia may make it possible to focus on a ‘purer’ version of  the actors’ intended dis-
course. 
Amid the main social networks, Facebook was preferred over the others for 
the analysis. Facebook’s role in Italian political communication has been highlighted 
in particular with reference to League’s leader Matteo Salvini, who had built at the 
time an online community of  more than 3,800,000 ‘friends’ on the platform (see 
Bobba 2019). Facebook remains the most common social media in Italy, having been 
used by 90.4% of  online users in 2018 (Coppola 2019). While fine-grained statistics 
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are not yet available for Italy, Facebook use does not seem to be particularly influ-
enced by age, census or membership of  a specific ethnic group in those countries 
where similar studies were carried out (Pew Research Center 2019). Nonetheless, it 
must be remembered that a series of  biases are potentially present: only 48% of  the 
adult Italian population were social media users in 2017 (Pew Research Center 2018). 
Furthermore, language on social media is more emotional and more prone to putting 
blame on opponents (Hameleers et al. 2017). Therefore, the results of  this study will 
have to be balanced with those obtained through other more traditional media. 
Posts were collected from the Facebook pages of  PD, League and M5S and 
of  their leaders (Matteo Renzi, Maurizio Martina and Nicola Zingaretti during their 
respective mandates as party secretaries for PD, Matteo Salvini for League and Luigi 
Di Maio for M5S). To these was also added the page of  Council President Paolo 
Gentiloni (who, as PD member, has been included in the PD cluster), while Giuseppe 
Conte, not being formally a member of  any party, has been excluded from the col-
lection. Posts were not collected over the entirety of  the three-year period, in order 
to obtain a sample of  manageable dimensions; instead, a series of  periods coinciding 
with critical events or processes related to immigration in Italy were identified, and 
all immigration-related posts from these periods were collected. 
The periods were selected in correspondence both with sudden and/or un-
anticipated events and with the presentation, discussion and implementation of  pol-
icies or programmatic points put forward by some of  the actors and opposed by 
others. As a result, I will refer to them using the more generic term ‘contexts’. The 
contexts selected were:  
• the signing of  the Italo-Lybian memorandum in February 2017; 
• the legislative conversion process of  the Orlando-Minniti decree on im-
migration between February and April 2017; 
• the defamation campaign against NGOs in March-May 2017 (during 
which NGO ships in the Mediterranean were accused of  conducting a 
shady ‘immigration business’, being paid by the traffickers); 
• the presentation of  the code of  conduct for NGOs in July 2017; 
Eric Repetto, So Far, Yet So Close: : Italian Parties’ Immigration Discourses During the Gentiloni and the 




• the Macerata attack (when on the 3rd February 2018 an Italian individual 
shot and tried to kill several migrants hosted in the town); 
• the sudden block imposed in August on the Diciotti vessel (one of  the 
first of  Salvini’s campaign against rescue ships, with an importance am-
plified by it being not an NGO ship, but an Italian military ship); 
• the legislative conversion processes of  the two Security decrees in Octo-
ber-December 2018 and June-August 2019 (whose latter period also in-
cludes the Sea Watch 3 case, another extremely mediatised case of  an 
NGO vessel being denied permission to land). 
 
The collection periods were selected differently according to the context, 
but always included at least one week before and one after the event, policy, or act, or 
the two weeks after it. For legislative acts, the periods ranged from the week prior to 
the act’s formal presentation in Parliament, as the legislative proposal had usually al-
ready been made public, to the week after its approval. For the Lybia memorandum 
and the code of  conduct there was no clear-cut end to the debate: in the former case, 
the collection period included the two weeks after its announcement, as this repre-
sented the first moment the agreement was clearly presented to the public. In the case 
of  the code of  conduct, the period started when the code was first anticipated on 2nd 
July 2017 and ended one week after its coming into effect, on 1st August 2017. For 
the other unanticipated events, the period started from the day of  the event until two 
weeks later. The case of  the NGO defamation campaign did not fit well into these 
categories due to its continuous and sustained nature: therefore, the period selected 
ranged from the first news on a judicial inquiry by attorney Zuccaro on NGOs, on 
17 February, to two weeks after a televised interview of  the same attorney on 27 
April. The final periods are thus: from 02/02/17 to 11/05/17; from 02/07/17 to 
08/08/17; from 03/02/18 to 17/02/18; from 16/08/18 to 30/08/18; from 
27/09/18 to 01/12/18; and from 08/06/19 to 12/08/19, for a total of  more than 
41 weeks of  collection. The longer periods have allowed for the collection also of  
several posts related to episodes of  criminality, European politics and negotiations, 
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relationships with foreign states (France in particular), electoral speeches and other 
more generic interventions on the immigration issue. 
Posts were collected on the basis of  a keyword search on each page,2 inte-
grated through the collection of  posts directly from the page feed. Such complemen-
tary collection was manual, as Facebook’s current API limitations do not allow to 
automatically scrape all posts from a page through dedicated software, but only a pre-
selected sample of  them (Facebook 2020). This double collection made it possible to 
include both posts hidden from the main feed (through the search) and photos and 
videos whose lack of  text would have excluded them from a keyword-based search. 
The only exception to this collection method was in the League and Salvini’s case: 
their Facebook posts published before the 2018 elections were not accessible through 
the feed, as the website proved unable to retrieve them as the feed was scrolled down 
to earlier dates. As this technical issue could not be solved and repeated itself  across 
multiple instances and devices, in this case only the posts from the keyword search 
were collected. The analysis section will also deal with the consistency of  these posts 
with the others scraped from the two pages, including the potential biases arising 
from them. In the case of  other media being attached to the posts, they were coded 
as well if  their content was produced by a party member or inasmuch it was clearly 
endorsed and referred to by the post; in the case of  contents whose link was not 
available anymore, the posts were coded whenever their text and the attached title 
were enough to provide material for the coding. 
Only contexts related to immigration proper have been selected: given the 
higher salience of  immigration policy compared to integration policy in Italy, the 
analysis adopts the former as its focal point. While the border between the two is 
 
2 The keywords used for the search were: ‘migrante/i’ (migrant/s), ‘immigrato/a/i/e’ (immigrant/s), 
‘clandestino/a/i/e’ (illegal migrant/s), ‘irregolare/i’ (irregular/s), ‘richiedente/i asilo’ (asylum 
seeker/s), ‘rifugiato/a/i/e’ (refugee/s), ‘africano/a/i/e’ (african/s), ‘arabo/a/i/e’ (arab/s), ‘musul-
mano/a/i/e’ (Muslim/s), ‘ONG’ (NGO), ‘migrazione/i’ (migration/s), ‘immigrazione’ (immigration), 
‘Macerata’, ‘Diciotti’, ‘Sea Watch’, Carola, Rackete, ‘decreto sicurezza’ (security decree), ‘decreto Min-
niti’ (Minniti decree). These keywords attempt to cover most of the approaches to the issue: several 
refer to the individuals involved or often associated with immigration, while the others refer to the 
phenomenon as a whole or are associated with one of the aforementioned contexts, either being the 
name of a relevant actor, of a setting or of a piece of legislation. 
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indeed permeable, integration issues present in posts have been included in the anal-
ysis whenever they are referred to in order to support a specific stance on immigra-
tion. For the same reason, in parallel, only posts referring to migrants or migrant sub-
categories have been included, while posts related exclusively to Roma or Muslim 
individuals already established in Italy have been excluded. It must be underlined that 
the sample used for the analysis is not meant to be a representative sample in a statis-
tical sense; it is designed to attempt to represent most party positions with reference 
to a broad and exhaustive series of  contexts of  the immigration debate, while satis-
fying the need for a small enough sample to be analysed qualitatively. 
The posts collected and analysed amount to 112 for the PD, 106 for the 
M5S and 314 for the League (see Table 1 below). In the League’s case, however, only 
a third of  them (32%) belong to the party’s opposition period, due to the above-
mentioned collection difficulty. 
 
Table 1 – Number of  posts collected by party and period and proportion (%) 
of  posts by party for each period. 
 PD M5S League Total 
Period  %  %  %  % 
02/02/17 to 11/05/17 14 14 34 35 49 51 97 100 
02/07/17 to 08/08/17 13 31 17 40 12 29 42 100 
03/02/18 to 17/02/18 19 31 5 8 38 61 62 100 
2018 elections 
16/08/18 to 30/08/18 15 25 16 27 29 48 60 100 
27/09/18 to 01/12/18 27 20 10 8 96 72 133 100 
08/06/19 to 12/08/19 24 17 24 17 90 65 138 100 
Total 112 21 106 20 314 59 532 100 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Collected posts have undergone both a qualitative discourse analysis and an 
extensive coding based on several criteria. Firstly, as for the coding, each post has 
been coded for every Othered subject (not only migrants) present and the way they 
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are constructed. The villain-victim dichotomy is expanded into five categories: en-
emified, criminalised, victimised, reified and a fifth category for all the other images 
depicted as despicable but not included within the previous ones (see Table 1). The 
Others identified were collective subjects who were differentially defined from the 
Self  to which the actor referred, and towards whom the actor acted or wanted to act 
according to reasons deriving at least partially from that very difference. The (actually 
absent) instances which provided positive images that did not fit within this scheme 
were to be coded separately, in order to avoid a potential bias towards negative and/or 
passive images. 
A second set of  codes has been applied to the frame or frames present: I 
have here mainly drawn from Helbling’s (2014) evaluative frames (see section 2), but 
with two additions: 1) a law and order frame (separated from security) and an exploi-
tation frame (needed in particular for categorising the M5S’s peculiar communication) 
(see Table 2); 2) Greussing and Boomgaarden’s (2017) economicisation frame has 
been conflated with the economic and social burden frame. In all cases, the coding 
unit was the post, to which one or more codes have been assigned according to the 
frames present. 
Table 2 – Nature of  each Othering category. 









Reference to illegal 
status 




Construction of  




that does not 
coincide with the 
other categories 
Victimisation    
Construction as 
victim 
   
Source: own elaboration 
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These codes allow for a better justification of  the results of  the discourse 
analysis. The frame-based coding is present to provide suggestions as to how images 
of  Others and the traditional evaluative frames may interact in producing specific 
meanings. With this amount of  data it is possible not only to identify what images of  
Others are present or dominant, but we may also construct for each actor the models 
of  the basic discourses in which these Others have been embedded in different peri-
ods. 
 
Table 3 – Nature of  each framing category. 
Economic and Social 
Burden 
Economic Prosperity Exploitation Humanitarian 
Economic 
disadvantages of  
immigration 
Labour and welfare 
competition 
Reception as a 
waste of  resources 
Economic 











Protection of  
human rights 
Prevention of  
deaths 





strengthening of  
criminal 
organisations 
Need for the 
respect of  law 




towards cultural and 
religious diversity 
and tolerance 
Defence of  
national identity 
and traditions 





do not provide a 
justification for the 
advocated policy 





   
Source: Own elaboration 
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4. Analysis and Discussion 
4.1. The Quantitative Results 
The results return varied insights on a relevant portion of  the Italian political 
discourse on the immigration issue: all three actors under study frame the issue and 
depict migrants in different ways (Tables 4 and 5). The results have been aggregated 
according to the actors’ incumbency or opposition role. It is important to note that 
the League’s posts from the opposition periods are consistent with the party’s com-
municative choices while in government, suggesting that there has been no major 
change in its rhetoric. Their results are somewhat more radical, with even less victim-
isation and humanitarian frames and more security ones; this might be due to a bias 
in the keyword collection, returning more written posts and short videos, accounting 
for a direct and less nuanced rhetoric, against longer videos and interviews. 
 
Table 4 – Proportion (%) of  Facebook posts coded for the presence of  each 
frame. 
 PD M5S League 
Frame Gov. Opp. All Gov. Opp. All Gov. Opp. All 
Economic and Social 
Burden 
0 0 0 0 4 2 21 15 19 
Economic Prosperity 2 6 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Exploitation 0 0 0 41 71 57 18 19 19 
Humanitarian 41 50 46 24 9 16 9 3 7 
Law and Order 17 13 15 18 0 8 61 51 58 
Multiculturalism 20 21 20 0 2 1 0 0 0 
Nationalistic 0 4 3 0 0 0 10 10 10 
Pragmatic 63 31 44 37 7 21 12 7 10 
Security 7 7 7 0 25 13 8 24 14 
*Each post could be assigned more than one code; column totals in all tables thus do not equal 100 
Source: own elaboration 
The PD’s two main frames are the humanitarian and pragmatic ones, with 
the multiculturalism and law and order ones in third and fourth place. When consid-
ering images of  the migrant Other, victimisations and reifications of  migrants are the 
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most common, followed by criminal images. Furthermore, at a closer look, the fre-
quency of  the law and order frame and criminal images are misleading: in the PD’s 
opposition period, all the criminal images and 67% of  the law and order frames are 
used in the context of  the first Security decree in order to criticise the government’s 
policies, which will produce people more likely to turn to delinquency due to the lack 
of  integration. In the party’s period in office, all of  the criminal images and 90% of  
the law and order frames come from Matteo Renzi’s Facebook page: in both cases it 
is specific individuals who are negatively framed, but without suggesting that they 
should be less deserving of  assistance or be repatriated.  
 
Table 5 – Proportion (%) of  Facebook posts coded for the presence of  each 
migrant image. 
 PD M5S League 
Frame Gov. Opp. All Gov. Opp. All Gov. Opp. All 
Enemified 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 6 5 
Criminalised 15 9 11 6 13 9 41 45 42 
General Negative 0 1 1 0 0 0 7 6 7 
Reified 37 13 23 6 2 4 7 9 8 
Victimised 22 43 34 14 2 7 11 4 9 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The M5S is especially focused on the immigration ‘business’, with a seem-
ingly mono-thematic obsession on exploitation when in opposition and a more mod-
erate stance when in government, tempered by pragmatic and humanitarian frames. 
Also the presence of  security frames drops to 0% when occupying office. However, 
part of  the exploitation frames were simply replaced by law and order frames after 
the promulgation of  the two Security decrees, which enshrined many of  the NGOs’ 
actions in the Mediterranean as legal infractions. The Movement’s most peculiar at-
tribute is evident when considering migrant images: only a small portion of  the Move-
ment’s Facebook immigration-related production refers to migrants, and when it 
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does, it swings between criminal, victim and reified images. Moreover, criminal images 
of  migrants mainly focus on their irregular and thus illegal status (90% of  the criminal 
images), but do not suggest further associations with delinquency and crime. There-
fore, they are not only much less numerous, but also less intense and radical than 
those of  the League. 
Finally, Salvini’s League focuses especially on a law and order framing of  the 
issue, with a series of  ancillary frames supporting it: in particular the exploitation and 
economic and social burden frames (this latter one is significantly adopted only by 
the League, amid the parties under study), and, more rarely, the nationalistic and se-
curity frames. As for migrant images, the dominant one is the criminal image, fol-
lowed by a group of  more generic negative depictions: these identify immigrants ei-
ther as culturally incompatible or as lazy ‘failed citizens’. There are also some associ-
ations with terrorists and, more generally, people who ‘don’t flee war, but bring it 
here’. At the same time, however, there is a proportion of  humanitarian frames and 
victim images: these are associated either with the need to stop the sea crossing in 
order to avoid more deaths, or with elders, women and children who really flee from 
war (versus young males who do not). A common element to all actors is the absence 
of  any reference to positive migrant agency. 
The results also allow us to study the images of  further Othered subjects in 
the posts, so that we may better understand the articulations of  the actors’ discourse. 
These results have been summarised in Table 6, aggregating enemy, criminal and neg-
ative images for each relevant subject. While enemy images will be also treated sepa-
rately later in the text, in many cases the distinction between criminalisation and a 
more general negative depiction was blurred and influenced by how much legislative 
power the party could wield, thus making a certain subject’s actions unlawful or not. 
The PD focuses on two subjects: the human traffickers in the Mediterranean, demon-
ised as the new slavers, and its right-wing and populist opponents, who fuel hatred 
and racism in the Italian society and lean towards authoritarian positions. The domi-
nance of  each subject is inverted with the passage from government to opposition, 
with traffickers reduced to nothingness and the frequency of  political opponents 
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more than tripling. The M5S constantly refers to a fuzzy group of  elites as its main 
target: i.e., right-wing and mostly left-wing politicians, the cooperatives working in 
the immigration sector, journalists and experts, and other prominent public figures. 
NGOs are associated to these individuals and groups in a general ensemble of  people 
illegally or at least despicably profiting from immigration or defending those who do. 
Traffickers and the EU are other recurring subjects: the former for the same reasons 
as the PD, and the latter due to its inability to help Italy or even its willingness to trick 
Italians into carrying the burden of  immigration alone. The frequency of  these sub-
jects changes as well, with the traffickers’ and NGOs’ proportions shrinking after the 
elections while the presence of  the EU becomes more prominent. A common ele-
ment between PD and M5S is the disappearance of  traffickers from their discourses 
after the 2018 elections. 
 
Table 6 – Proportion (%) of  Facebook posts coded for the presence of  an Oth-
ered subject that is not a migrant. 
 PD M5S League 
Frame Gov. Opp. All Gov. Opp. All Gov. Opp. All 
Eastern Europe 4 4 4 2 0 1 0 0 0 
EU 7 4 5 31 13 21 11 3 9 
France 0 0 0 6 4 5 6 0 4 
Human Traffickers 33 0 13 2 27 15 7 9 8 
NGOs 2 0 1 27 71 50 34 18 29 
Political  
Opponents 
2 66 48 - - - - - - 
Elites - - - 61 77 69 - - - 
Do-Gooders - - - - - - 34 42 36 
Source: own elaboration 
 
Lastly, the League places blame in particular on NGOs and ‘do-gooders’ (in 
Italian buonisti, with a strong negative connotation). ‘Do-gooders’ is a label used by 
populist radical right parties to refer to a varied group composed of  leftist politicians, 
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journalists, experts, cooperatives and transnational elites (at times led by billionaire 
George Soros himself), who, at best, are putting Italy in danger with irrational immi-
gration policies from which they profit, and at worst are willingly planning to ethni-
cally replace Italians and destroy the country’s sovereignty. The label is also used 
against common people opposing radical anti-immigration policies. 
A final element to consider is the frequency with which the actors have pro-
duced enemy images of  these subjects in their Facebook communication. Indeed, all 
of  them have, but in different ways. The PD has enemified only human traffickers, 
doing so in 20% of  the cases in which it cited them while in government. The best 
example is Graziano Delrio’s interview with newspaper La Repubblica: ‘We are at war 
with the traffickers. A true war, not in TV debates’ (Delrio 2017). The M5S has also 
enemified NGOs (4% of  NGO posts), elites (3% of  elites posts) and traffickers (19% 
of  trafficker posts). The League has done the same with do-gooders (3% of  all do-
gooder posts) and NGOs (11% of  all NGO posts). 
 
4.2. The Basic Discourses 
By integrating the previous results with a detailed qualitative analysis of  the 
sample, we can now describe the basic discourses produced by each actor. Basic dis-
courses are ideal-types which identify particular sections of  the wider public dis-
course: they associate Selves and Others on the basis of  specific spatial, temporal and 
ethical identities and construct links between identity and policy (Hansen 2006). 
 
4.2.1. League 
As we have seen, the League’s posts are predominantly against immigrants, 
but with a significant proportion adopting humanitarian frames and victim images. 
Indeed, Salvini and his party articulate a clear rhetoric of  deservingness (Boltanski 
1999; Holzberg et al. 2018; Rheindorf & Wodak 2018; Vollmer & Karakayali 2018), 
where ‘real’ refugees fleeing from war are opposed to economic illegal immigrants. 
The former are exclusively identified with elders, women and children, so that young 
males are associated with clandestine migrants. A clear example of  this distinction 
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comes from Salvini’s interview on TV program Pomeriggio 5: 
Those who flee from war, women, children, my home is their home. The problem is 
that among the hundreds of  immigrants who have arrived, some – let us think of  San 
Lorenzo, in Rome [where three migrants had been charged with killing a young girl] – 
have brought war in our home. And I do not need these people in Italy (Salvini 2018). 
 
Salvini and the League succeed in making the border between refugee and 
illegal immigrant overlap with that between grateful migrant and terrorist, criminal or 
simply disrespectful. Illegal migrants are despicable predominantly because they com-
mit crimes, but also because they are disrespectful towards Italian culture, religion and 
traditions and because they represent a burden which prevents millions of  Italians in 
poverty from being helped: 
With 4 million and a half  Italians who survive below the poverty line, I believe that we 
need first to care about these people, before letting a single immigrant land or regular-
ise them (Salvini 2017b). 
 
Illegal immigrants are associated with other negative subjects: human traf-
fickers, NGOs and the wider group of  the ‘do-gooders’. Traffickers are criminals who 
break the law and profit from the lives of  migrants (although this is often not enough 
to empathise with those they exploit, when they are not poor and do not flee from 
war (Salvini 2019a)). NGOs are associated with traffickers and sometimes even con-
sidered outright enemies, as in the Sea Watch case (Salvini 2019b); in another example, 
Salvini’s Facebook page shares on 28 March 2017 a conspiracy theory which claims 
that European elites are plotting to replace white Europeans with Africans, according 
to the century-old so-called ‘Kalergi plan’ (Salvini 2017a). The resulting discourse (see 
Figure 1) is in its entirety a clear example of  securitisation and moralisation of  bor-
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Figure 1 – Graphical representation of  the League’s basic discourse. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The main Other is the illegal migrant, associated with other nefarious sub-
jects and clearly split from its opposite, the victimised deserving refugee. Against il-
legal immigrants, who seem to make up almost the entirety of  the immigrant popu-
lation, the League and its leader depict themselves as the defenders of  an ethnic Ital-
ian Self  which they represent. It is this Self  that is in danger and must be rescued, 
through the closure of  borders and the repatriation of  all those not worthy of  re-
maining in Italian territory. 
 
4.2.2. M5S 
The key distinguishing element of  the M5S’s discourse is the relative absence 
of  migrants. Migrants are present in few posts and with conflicting depictions: some-
times as illegal irregulars, sometimes as victims (although the relative dominance of  
these two is inverted after taking office). The lion’s share of  Othered subjects belongs 
to a heterogeneous group of  elites, followed by NGOs, the European Union and 
traffickers. Apart from the European Union, these subjects are generally depicted as 
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criminals or despised for supporting those who criminally profit from the ‘business’. 
They may also be enemified: at the height of  the NGO scandal in April 2017, the 
Movement’s leader Di Maio’s official page shares an interview by attorney Carmelo 
Zuccaro on TV channel Rai3, in which Zuccaro declares: 
In my opinion NGOs might be financed – some NGOs, I repeat – by the traffickers. 
I know there are contacts. It is a business that now rewards as much as drug smuggling 
[…]. It might also be possible – the matter might be even more disquieting – that some 
of  these NGOs pursue different goals, to destabilise the Italian economy for example. 
Those who would profit from a weak Italian economy, weakness which is doubtlessly 
incremented by an uncontrolled influx of  migrants, might see such situation as advan-
tageous (Di Maio 2017). 
 
Similarly, also politicians are sometimes defined as ‘traitors’ of  the Italian 
people: both the PD (M5S 2017) and Berlusconi (M5S 2018) undergo this radical 
Othering process. 
While the M5S somewhat moderates its stance when in government, the 
articulation of  its discourse does not change (see Figure 2). It is an atypical discourse, 
which does not correspond to any of  the types already identified in literature; only 
Gianfreda (2018), analysing Italian parliamentary debates, already notices its peculiar-
ity. The Movement’s focus is related to its ‘pure’ populist origins: instead of  articulat-
ing a conflict between an ethnic Italian Self  and a migrant Other, it draws a line be-
tween the Italian people and the elites that the populists oppose. The immigration 
issue is only another field in the fight against the caste of  the privileged, and the role 
of  migrants is overlooked; we might term this a case of  ‘absconded Other’. This is 
likely to be intentional, in order not to lean towards any of  the extremes of  the po-
litical spectrum while effectively criticising the PD first and supporting the League 
later. As other parties make instead explicit in the wider debate the presence of  mi-
grants, however, it is fair to assume that this discourse alone is not capable of  justify-
ing why migrants should simply suffer the collateral damage of  policies that are pre-
sented as theoretically not targeting them. 
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Figure 2 – Graphical representation of  the M5S’s basic discourse. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
4.2.3. PD 
The PD’s discourse presents some structural changes which make it useful 
to distinguish between the period in office and that in opposition. Its distinctive at-
tribute is the duality between the victimised migrant and the reified migrant. When 
leading the government, the PD uses predominantly reified images of  the migrant 
Other: migrants are de-individualised and either turned into a de-humanised collec-
tive form (‘flows’; ‘the migratory phenomenon’) or expressed as numbers. A typical 
expression is ‘governing the flows’, expressing a technical and de-humanised ap-
proach to the issue. Gentiloni announces the Libyan memorandum with these words: 
We talk in this deal about the organisation of  the camps in Libya and the cooperation 
in this with the international organisations, the repatriations from Libya to the origin 
countries, we talk about border police, coast guard, it is the description of  a possible 
path to reduce and govern the migratory flows (Gentiloni 2017). 
 
Victim images are present in the collection periods only with reference to 
the crossing of  the Mediterranean, and not to the condition of  the Lybian camps. 
The victimised migrants are opposed to the politicians who campaign on the immi-
gration issue, eliciting xenophobia, but most importantly to the human traffickers, 
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with whom the PD constructs a radical and even war-like opposition. Their inhumane 
nature is often highlighted, for example in this passage by Renzi: 
This happened after we saw the images – when the shipwreck sank and there were the 
children locked in the hold, they had locked them up because they were noisy, during 
that journey of death (Renzi 2018). 
 
Here lies a specific and under-investigated articulation of  Self  and Others 
(see Figure 3), often considered an instance of  pragmatic rationalisation (Triandafyl-
lidou 2018). The reified migrant Other is dehumanised and turns immigration into a 
technical issue of  management, where ‘governing the flows’ does not elicit problem-
atic associations with the humanity and individual biographies of  migrants. Victim 
images can still be used when it may mark a difference from more radical parties, 
appeasing a section of  the party’s electorate. Despite referring to the same migrants, 
these images are not associated to each other, nor are they put in opposition; their 
relation is simply left in ambiguity. Moreover, while migrants are an explicit target of  
the government’s policies, the main opposition is not with them, but between the 
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Figure 3 – Graphical representation of  the PD’s basic discourse while in of-
fice. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
When in opposition, victim images become predominant over reified ones 
(see Figure 4); besides the sea crossings, they also become related to immigrants al-
ready in Italy’s reception system. Moreover, traffickers disappear, while the main op-
position is constructed against the Conte government and Salvini in particular, who 
is increasingly viewed as a dangerous and inhumane minister (PD 2018). The imper-
ative becomes, therefore, to oppose the government’s policies; thus, also here the 
main Self-Other opposition does not relate to migrants directly, but is inscribed in 
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Figure 4 – Graphical representation of  the PD’s basic discourse while in op-
position. 
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
4.3. Discussing the Results. New Hypotheses for Party Competition Models 
The basic discourses presented above allow us to understand in more depth 
each party’s stance. While the League’s discourse reproduces most of  the anti-immi-
gration discursive practices already analysed in the literature, both the M5S’s and PD’s 
discourses are interesting in different ways. The M5S’s is an atypical one for a party 
opposing immigration, although actually traceable to the party’s populist background. 
The PD’s discourse might seem dominated by a pragmatic and rational framing when 
in office, but if  we investigate the images employed, we understand how this actually 
produces a considerable de-humanising potential. The party’s discourse while in op-
position becomes again more typically humanitarian. 
These discourses do not exist as monads but interact with each other and 
the wider media environment. When considering their interaction, the logical 
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structure of  each discourse becomes an important factor. The League’s discourse 
(and the PD’s opposition one) are complete in their structure: they identify a problem 
and associate it with an opposing Other who is delegitimised and whose nature and 
characteristics justify their action. The M5S tries to do the same, but by bundling the 
immigration issue with another one which they own, i.e. the fight against the elites. 
Therefore, migrants are hidden, but should their presence be made clear no justifica-
tion is present as to why they should just endure the collateral damage of  a policy 
action not aimed at them. The discourse rests on overwriting the migrant Other with 
another one more suitable to the party’s programme, but it becomes weaker if  the 
migrant Other is made explicit. The governing PD also tries to shift the blame to the 
trafficker Other, but without enough strength; at the same time, it focuses on its tech-
nical policy-making ability to solve the immigration issue. Migrants are reified as a 
technicality and the issue is pragmatised, but there is very little justification why the 
issue should be a problem at all.  
I thus argue that both discourses, while they try not to explicitly take stances 
that might displease parts of  their electorate, have to rely on external sources to main-
tain their consistency. This source is the more radical right-wing discourse, which 
delegitimises migrants as a radical Other and constructs immigration as an urgent 
problem. Therefore, while trying to defuse or bundle the issue, both parties are actu-
ally legitimising the most radical discourse and its main elements. The result of  this 
process is a spectralisation of  the migrant Other in the political discourse. Besides the 
radical right’s criminalised immigrant, migrants for the other main parties become a 
spectre, an open secret avoided by official communication but which produces and 
justifies a diffuse sense of  societal unease. This unease, in turn, fuels into the most 
radical representations of  the migrant Other. We might hypothesise that this interac-
tion is at work also in other national party systems. 
We might also wonder whether some policy choices are correlated with cer-
tain discursive constructions. In order to provide an answer, I would like to introduce 
a new concept: while actually most of  the discourses have seemed to justify restrictive 
policies, either through radical Othering or through other forms of  de-humanisation, 
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it seems possible that radical Othering is correlated with the dramatisation of  those 
policies. We might define a policy as dramatised when it is planned, implemented and 
communicated in order for it to be clearly visible and to exalt the role of  its proposers 
over those who are damaged by it. Policy dramatisation occurs together with the dis-
cursive production of  a radical Other whose different nature is perceived as threat-
ening. Rather than imagining policy dramatisation to be caused by radical Othering 
or vice versa, we should conceive of  them as organic to one another: indeed, they 
both rest on aggressive communication aimed at exalting the difference between two 
subjects. However, we can assume that dramatised policies do not only differ in the 
way they are communicatively presented, but also in some of  their attributes, which 
would thus be correlated also with the parties’ basic discourses. In the immigration 
field an actor who avoids radical Othering and dramatisation will likely focus first on 
border externalisation and, if  necessary, stopping boats on the high seas, rather than 
preventing disembarking when already in the harbour, as in the Diciotti case, where it 
is more likely to draw attention. Moreover, being able to dramatise one’s policies 
means multiplying the chances for an actor to employ radical Othering discourse. 
Policy dramatisation, together with issue ownership, provides a useful means 
of  interpretation of  parties’ behaviour in the Italian case, which may be generalisable 
to other cases. During the PD government, the pressure posed by a radical right party 
owning the immigration issue (the League) pushed the other two office-seeking par-
ties with lower issue ownership to try not to lose electorally to this trend while adopt-
ing a blame-shifting strategy. The PD’s blame-shifting approach targeted human traf-
fickers while being supported by a pragmatised discourse, while the M5S tried to 
overwrite the migrant Other with the Italian elites. Policy dramatisation might be the 
key to explaining the PD’s sudden discursive shift when in opposition: once the 
League began to govern and was able to implement more dramatised immigration 
policies the previous uneasy balance of  the PD’s discourse, based on hiding the con-
troversial migrant subject, became impossible to sustain without making explicit its 
contradictions. The PD thus began to target the governing parties themselves and the 
League in particular. These hypotheses might allow us to reconsider the effects of  
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discursive practices and interactions on party competition over immigration. For in-
stance, they may provide us with a different interpretation of  mainstream left parties’ 
tendency to adopt more pragmatic stances when in government. While the traditional 
interpretation is that mainstream left parties shift to pragmatic stances when, and due 
to, being in government, we might actually hypothesise that their more open and hu-
manitarian stances do not simply represent a ‘default’ approach that changes when 
being incumbent, but constitute a response to being in the opposition of  parties who 
employ radical Othering and policy dramatisation. Parties such as the League, when 
in government, combine their radical discourse with the chance of  dramatising im-
migration policies. The result is that the pragmatic mainstream left discourse, which 
hides the migrant subject becomes unsustainable due to the extreme mediatisation of  
the issue which leads to a more opposing humanitarian stance. 
 
5. Final Remarks 
The results of  the present work are useful from more than one perspective. 
A variety of  Others have been identified in the discourse of  three relevant Italian 
party actors, compared with dominant frames and used as a foundation for the char-
acterisation of  each party’s basic discourses. In a European context stably character-
ised by tough stances on immigration, the results show in detail how broadly different 
discourses may similarly justify stricter policies, reinforcing each other and sustaining 
a wider spectralisation of  the migrant in the public debate. From a theoretical point 
of  view, they provide bases for a better interaction between different strands of  re-
search in the migration field. The work indeed suggests some further categories for 
coding in quantitative analyses which might better capture the discursive nuances em-
ployed by certain actors, avoiding simple ‘humanitarian’ or ‘pragmatic’ classifications 
through an increased focus on images of  Others. Finally, the last hypotheses might 
expand our understanding of  the interactions between actors’ discursive shifts, con-
textual political competition and policy choices. Their suggestions should be verified 
in other countries in order to accept their validity.  
A few limits are present within this work. On a theoretical level, the 
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categorisation of  Other images has been quite arbitrary, in a literature which has not 
yet consistently articulated the idea of  different Other types according to different 
radicality or other characteristics (see Croft 2012 for a review of  different Other 
types, which however does not focus exactly on degrees of  radicality). Moreover, fo-
cusing only on Facebook communication has allowed for a ‘purer’ analysis of  parties’ 
discourse, but has at the same time excluded further media outlets which might have 
challenged the actors’ attempts at setting the agenda on their own terms and 
prompted them to develop different discursive articulations. Besides developing the 
above-mentioned hypotheses on party competition, further country-comparative re-
search might help us understand whether the basic discourses found in Italy are com-
mon ideal-types in other European states; at the same time, other party families 
should be included in the analyses. Most importantly, further research should also 
study the interplay between parties and the other actors who produce discourse in 
the public sphere; while this study has assumed, based on previous research, that 
public discourse was generally favourable to tougher stances and migrant radical Oth-
ering in Italy during this period, different contexts might influence the production of  
different basic discourses and the modalities and outcomes of  their interaction. 
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